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The number, range and foci of voluntary initiatives have been growing rapidly over
the last decade, but there is still debate as to whether they work ‘on the ground’. The
paper begins by defining voluntary initiatives and considers their relative strengths
and weaknesses. The main factors contributing to their effectiveness—monitoring,
transparency, enforcement, content and compulsoriness—are discussed and are
then reviewed in light of an Australian case study of a mining industry initiative. Inter-
views with mining industry executives and other stakeholders are used to offer
insights into the ways in which the efficacy of voluntary initiatives might be improved.
It is here that a paradox emerges: the voluntary initiatives with the most potential
for success appear to be those that are, effectively, compulsory. The paper concludes
by discussing the key ways in which ‘compulsory’ voluntary initiatives might differ
from command-and-control regulation and the broader implications of this apparent
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oluntary initiatives in the mining industry are a relatively recent
phenomenon. They began to emerge around the mid-1990s and their numbers
have increased substantially, particularly from 2000 onwards. This paper exam-
ines the phenomenon of voluntary initiatives as a form of regulating the envi-
ronmental performance of the mining industry. In particular, it seeks to answer
the question: do voluntary initiatives in the mining industry work? 
A simple question, but reaching a definitive answer is not easy. Many voluntary ini-
tiatives are still in their infancy, so rigorous empirical research into their functional effect
is sparse. It may, in fact, take many years for a voluntary initiative to have a measurable
impact on environmental performance. It is also difficult to separate out individual vol-
untary initiatives as a single cause of change from other relevant factors at institutional
and societal levels. 
In this paper, we begin by defining ‘voluntary initiatives’ and considering some of the
strengths and weaknesses of a voluntary approach. We place the emergence of voluntary
initiatives as a form of regulation within a broader and evolving context of environmental
governance. Next we summarise the published research into the effectiveness and
impacts of voluntary initiatives across a range of industry sectors, including the mining
sector. This allows us to identify the ‘key effectiveness features’ of voluntary initiatives. 
We then focus specifically on the mining industry. Drawing on qualitative interviews
conducted between 2003 and 2005, we examine the development, adoption and imple-
mentation of voluntary initiatives and how they might be improved. Our analysis centres
on a voluntary initiative that was developed specifically for addressing environmental
performance: the Minerals Council of Australia Code for Environmental Management
(MCA Code). 
The concluding section returns to the issue of voluntary versus compulsory approaches
to the regulation of environmental management. The essential difference appears to
concern the privatisation of regulation, which taps into wider debates about the chang-
ing nature of regulation in contemporary capitalist societies. 
Voluntary initiatives as a form of regulation
It is difficult to define ‘voluntary initiatives’ without using some form of caveat. Their
‘essential characteristic is the “course of voluntarism” ’ (Cunningham and Clinch 2004,
citing Baeke et al. 1999; Clinch 2000), but a range of internal and external forces can
mean that their voluntarism is not absolute (Gunningham and Sinclair 2001: 3). They
are ‘private or public efforts to improve corporate environmental behaviour beyond exist-
ing legal requirements’ (Paton 2000), but they can become enshrined in law. To add to
the confusion, Cunningham and Clinch (2004: 30-31) reviewed a range of literature and
found that terms such as voluntary approaches, self-regulation, self-commitments, envi-
ronmental accords, private agreements, voluntary initiatives, industry initiatives and
public voluntary schemes are often used interchangeably and inconsistently.
Voluntary initiatives are usually discussed in comparison with, and as an alternative
to, traditional government-directed ‘command-and-control’ regulation. Potoski and
Prakash (2005a) provide evidence of the effect of command-and-control approaches in
significantly reducing industrial pollution. However, command and control has been
criticised for being expensive to comply with, monitor and enforce (Coglianese and Nash
2001) and for cultivating an adversarial culture between business and government
(Webb 2006b). Others have observed that companies prefer not to be subject to legally
binding regulation that may create liability for damage by their operations or subject
them to criminal law (Clapp 2003).
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By way of contrast, voluntary initiatives have been said to present a number of advan-
tages as a form of regulation. Voluntary initiatives may provide a means of regulating
the activities of companies operating globally (Campbell 2006), allowing for the regu-
lation of local and global environmental impacts in the absence of effective national or
international laws. Far from being ‘toothless’ and ‘unimportant’, Braithwaite and Dra-
hos (2000) argue that voluntary initiatives play a significant role in the globalisation of
standards and the mobilisation of business towards improved performance. The poten-
tial of voluntary initiatives for transboundary application may also fill a gap for compa-
nies that operate across a number of jurisdictions and seek consistent international
standards (Gleckman 2004). Many voluntary initiatives are initiated in order to respond
to societal demands for action (Kolk and Tulder 2005: 7) and several international insti-
tutions, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, have encouraged their devel-
opment. Some authors suggest that voluntary initiatives have a better chance of
weathering political change than command-and-control approaches (Arnold and Whit-
ford 2006: 4), while others advocate the ability of such approaches to stimulate inno-
vation and respond to newly emerging issues (Paton 2000). Gunningham and Sinclair
(2002: 148-49) propose that voluntary initiatives ‘provide greater flexibility to enter-
prises in their response, greater ownership of solutions that they are directly involved
in creating, less resistance, greater legitimacy, greater speed of decision-making, sensi-
tivity to market circumstances and lower costs’. 
There is no avoiding a caveat, however. These potential advantages are contingent on
voluntary initiatives being ‘viable’ (Gunningham and Sinclair 2002: 149) or appropri-
ate with regard to contextual considerations such as industry structure and capacity, pol-
icy context and political culture (Moffet and Bregha 1999: 20-22). Weaknesses of
voluntary initiatives are said to include lack of sanctions, limited enforcement, lack of
specificity of standards and objectives, and failure to attract the poorer performers within
a sector (Brereton 2003). Webb and Morrison (2006) describe the main criticisms of
voluntary initiatives as including: ‘lower visibility and credibility; difficulty in applying
the rules to those who do not wish to participate in the program, the possibility of less
rigorous standards being developed, uncertain public accountability and potentially
weaker enforcement capacity’.
Despite this ambivalence towards voluntary initiatives, they are increasingly preva-
lent. They can be seen as a product of a broader sociopolitical environment, characterised
by globalisation, the dominance of neoliberal policies and the changing roles of indus-
try, civil society and the state. In relation to the mining industry, a series of mergers and
acquisitions has significantly increased the size, financial and social power of individ-
ual corporations. There has been a growing public awareness of environmental and
social issues; an exponential growth in the number of influential environmental and
social NGOs (non-governmental organisations), some of which have targeted campaigns
at the mining industry; and an increased use of information technology to scrutinise
mining activity and rapidly disseminate information to global networks. Probably a key
change of the last decade has been reforms in government regulation of the environ-
ment and processes for development approval. Together these shifts have formed a fer-
tile background for the emergence of voluntary initiatives. While focus is increasingly
on sustainable development as a whole, we will focus in this paper on those initiatives
that relate to environmental management and performance. 
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Effectiveness and impacts of voluntary initiatives across a range of
industry sectors
Measuring the impact of voluntary initiatives on environmental performance is a com-
plicated task. As Paton (2000: 330) observes, there has been scant data on the effec-
tiveness of voluntary initiatives and no standard baseline against which to appraise
environmental programmes. Another challenge is to attribute impacts of voluntary ini-
tiatives independent from the many other influences on business behaviour. There is
also evidence to suggest that many voluntary initiatives concentrate on the space
between good performers and great performers (Bass et al. 2001). This makes it diffi-
cult to determine impact. If companies that are already good performers are adopting
voluntary initiatives, the level of improvement may be of less import than recognition of
existing practices. 
One voluntary environmental management initiative, ISO 14001, is a multi-sector
case that has been relatively well studied. Potoski and Prakash (2005a) analysed over
3,000 facilities in the US and demonstrated that, even after controlling for external fac-
tors (such as regulatory compliance history and the facility’s reason for joining ISO
14001), the ISO 14001-certified facilities had reduced their pollution more than non-cer-
tified facilities. Schylander and Martinuzzi (2007) reached a similar conclusion in their
study in Austria, finding that direct improvements attributable to ISO 14001 adoption
could be seen in some areas, particularly in waste and recycling. The impact of ISO 14001
on raising awareness of environmental issues within companies was described by Schy-
lander and Martinuzzi as the ‘most important contribution of ISO 14001’. However, ISO
14001 has also been criticised for being a systems-based approach, concerned with pro-
cedures rather than outcomes (Krut and Gleckman 1998).
Another case is the NGO-driven Forest Stewardship Council initiative, which has been
able to achieve a relatively high level of visibility with the general public in the timber
products market with standards developed by a tripartite governance arrangement (For-
est Stewardship Council 2007; Bernstein and Cashore 2004; Conroy 2001). Uptake in
the initiative continues to increase, with more than 90 million hectares of forest being
certified in the past 13 years (Forest Stewardship Council 2007). However, the success
and credibility of the initiative is still contested by some NGOs (Counsell and Loraas
2002; Bass et al. 2001) and its dependence on market viability leaves it vulnerable to
continued criticism. 
These examples demonstrate that, even with regard to ‘successful’ voluntary initia-
tives, a number of factors need to be addressed to allow such approaches to reach their
full potential as an effective means of regulating environmental performance. There is
a considerable level of consensus throughout the literature as to these factors, across
industry sectors. We have identified these ‘key effectiveness factors’ as:
t Monitoring, including evaluation, verification and meta-regulation. This is essen-
tial for assessing effectiveness and performance claims; credibility is enhanced if
carried out or verified by third parties (Gunningham and Sinclair 2002; Feiler 2002;
Sethi 2005)
t Transparency, including disclosure, publication and public involvement. Creates
the conditions for external scrutiny and enhances credibility (Campbell 2006; Gun-
ningham and Sinclair 2001; Grant and Taylor 2004) 
t Enforcement, including sanctions and penalties. Although initiatives are voluntary,
it is still believed incentives and/or remedies are required to address non-compli-
ance (Cunningham and Clinch 2004; Potoski and Prakash 2005a)
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t Content, including design, objectives, standards and measurable targets. The criti-
cal content needs to be clearly defined, rigorous, outcome-based and not ‘captured’
by particular interests (Moran 2002; Walker and Howard 2002)
t Compulsoriness, including mandatory application and incentives for adoption. It
is argued that the broader the adoption of an initiative, the better the impact and
effectiveness (O’Higgins 2006; Moffet and Bregha 1999; Paton 2000)
Even where voluntary initiatives are weak and/or do not appear to primarily improve
performance, they have been shown to have a range of ancillary effects. These can
include:
t Influencing company reputation and stakeholder trust (with or without justifica-
tion) (Potoski and Prakash 2005b) 
t Potentially influencing the future development of regulatory standards by raising
the bar on standards (Brereton 2003)
t Bringing together the disparate expectations of companies and stakeholders as to
standards of responsible behaviour (Hsieh 2006) 
t Raising general awareness of environmental issues within companies (Strachan et
al. 2003)
t Making a company more accountable for performing the actions specified in the
code (Hsieh 2006)
t Contributing to the creation of new international institutions (Kolk and Tulder
2005: 19)
These ancillary effects, though arguably useful, do not, however, directly address the
central aim of voluntary initiatives to regulate performance. In the next section, we will
consider these issues. 
Voluntary initiatives in the mining industry
A chronology of mining industry-relevant initiatives that we constructed for the Mining
Certification Evaluation Project (MCEP) highlights their expanding presence since the
mid-1990s (see Solomon et al. 2006: 17-21). In essence, development of various min-
ing industry-relevant initiatives seems to have been in almost constant progress over
the last decade. The MCEP chronology also demonstrates the diverse nature and focus
of the instruments that seek to apply to the activities of the mining industry. Since that
chronology was published, the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA) for-
mally commenced, which draws on the work of both the North American-based Frame-
work for Responsible Mining and the Australian-based MCEP.1 It describes itself as a
‘voluntary, multi-sector effort to create a verification system in the mining sector to
assure compliance with environmental, human rights and social standards’ and
progress is periodically reported on its website (IRMA 2006, 2007). It is the latest in a
series of voluntary initiatives for the mining sector.
In this section, we identify some of the key participant groups in the development of
voluntary initiatives in the mining industry. We then explore what motivates mining
companies to adopt voluntary initiatives and how the elements of voluntary initiatives
GMI 53 31
voluntary initiatives in the mining industry: do they work?
1 Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA) website, www.responsiblemining.net.
gmi53schiavi.qxd  2/1/08  08:28  Page 31
                                
are integrated into corporate activity. To investigate our core question ‘do voluntary ini-
tiatives work?’ we focus on a specific case, the Minerals Council of Australia Code for
Environmental Management (MCA Code). 
We draw from a series of qualitative, in-depth interviews conducted between 2003
and 2005 with executive managers of large mining corporations in Australia and inter-
nationally, representatives of global NGOs and government regulators in Australia. Our
focus is, however, predominantly on the perspectives of mining company executives
who have been active in developing and/or adopting voluntary initiatives in the sector. 
The development of voluntary initiatives: Participants
A review of listed participants in initiatives such as IRMA, the International Council on
Mining and Metals (ICMM) Sustainable Development Framework, the Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Mining Sec-
tor Supplement indicates that it is primarily large mining companies that are involved
in their development. While smaller companies may become involved in nationally
based subsidiaries of these initiatives, such as the Mineral Council of Australia’s re-
branding of the ICMM Sustainable Development Framework as a national code called
Enduring Value (MCA 2004), it is fair to say that, in general, their participation in ini-
tiative development and governance is relatively minor. 
NGOs are the other key groups that are active in the development of voluntary initia-
tives relevant to the mining industry. For example, WWF, Global Witness and Conser-
vation International have all taken a leading role in the development of various
instruments. This is not to say that all NGOs would consider such involvement; for exam-
ple, Friends of the Earth oppose voluntary initiatives as a means of regulating corporate
activities and argue instead for more effective government regulation (Friends of the
Earth 2002). Our interview data suggests that even for NGOs that are involved in the
development of voluntary initiatives, government regulation remains the preferred reg-
ulatory strategy, although it is perhaps slower: 
Basically in terms of codes of conduct, we say they’re great for industry . . . because they
should be constantly trying to improve themselves . . . However, it’s no replacement for
regulation (NGO #4).
Conceivably [a voluntary] system might be quicker than government regulation. It might
also establish a dialogue where the actual performance standard can be thrashed out,
perhaps a bit more efficiently than it might otherwise take place (NGO #1).
Other significant contributors to the development of voluntary initiatives in the mining
industry include international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and World
Bank, the finance sector, major accounting firms, as well as some government bodies. 
The adoption and implementation of 
voluntary initiatives: reputation and selectivity
The main message from the mining executives’ interviews was that companies pri-
marily adopt voluntary initiatives as a means of improving their reputation. This is con-
sistent with the findings of similar empirical research (for example, Gunningham and
Sinclair 2001, 2002; Bartley 2003; Potoski and Prakash 2005b). Gunningham and Sin-
clair (2001: 5) further submit that, ‘those with reputational capital will be those who ben-
efit from greater access to government and planning approvals, community acceptance
and preferred access to prospective areas and projects’.
The dominance of reputation considerations is consistent with the contextualising of
sustainable development ideas for the industry within the concept of a ‘social licence to
petrina schiavi and fiona solomon
32 GMI 53
gmi53schiavi.qxd  2/1/08  08:28  Page 32
            
operate’ (for example, MCA 2004). The attention paid to reputation meant that volun-
tary initiatives were not necessarily seen as having a significant impact on a company’s
performance:
[Mine site certification is] all about reinforcing our reputation, which therefore opens
opportunities. If we can say, ‘look, all of our mine sites are certified and if we come and
develop a project in your country, we’ll get that certified as well’. If the scheme has cred-
ibility, then people will feel more comfortable with us than they might with a competi-
tor who doesn’t have sites certified or only has one certified or has no intention of getting
certified, so it provides again another benchmark of credibility and performance I think.
So it is really about reputation, I’m not sure there’s anything else (Executive #1).
Voluntary things, like membership of EITI and the voluntary principles on security [and
human rights], I think they have a lot more to do with your global reputation than any-
thing else. For some companies they are drivers, maybe they are to some degree for [this
company], I don’t know—but I don’t really see them as a driver because I don’t feel dri-
ven by those (Executive #11).
The conversion of the elements of voluntary initiatives from high-level policy to specific
actions to be undertaken by employees is a critical task for implementation. However,
Brereton (2003: 274) observes that, ‘Across the board in the [mining] industry, trans-
lating higher level commitments into changed practices on the ground is proving to be
an ongoing challenge for management.’ This process of ‘translation’ not only highlights
the complexities of integrating the company’s commitment to a voluntary initiative into
existing management standards and practices, but also reveals a level of subjectivity in
this process. 
Mining executives described their implementation of voluntary initiatives as a three-
stage process. First, they identify the elements of voluntary initiatives that they see to be
‘relevant’ or ‘of value’ to their corporation. They then undertake a gap analysis of their
existing internal management system to see where and how they can integrate those
elements. Finally, they amend their management systems’ policies and procedures to
address the identified gaps. These interview extracts from two executives from different
mining companies demonstrate the similarities of their approaches: 
So we committed to the UN Declaration on Human Rights, for example, and then really
tried to pull the key elements out of all of those in terms of the ones that are relevant to
our sort of business and build that into our management standards . . . We slowly fill
the gaps as we become aware of new initiatives and new expectations that we think are
logical and sensible for us to adopt. So we don’t always adopt everything that comes along
but we’ve got a pretty solid core now that enables us to [build on what we have already
got] rather than continually throw stuff out and say we’ll start again or adopt this (Exec-
utive #1; our emphasis added).
It’s almost impossible to deal with [voluntary initiatives] as individual elements. So one
thing you do if there is a new code is that you go through it and set it against your man-
agement system and there’ll often be a couple of things that appear as though they should
be managed at a higher level than what we are. So basically if that’s the case you’ll come
back and then adjust the management system on the understanding that all the other
ones are of lesser requirement, so will be met by complying with the highest one of the
range of codes. That’s a long-winded way of saying that we pick the eyes out of them and
set the standards appropriately. I mean, that’s probably the easiest way around it (Exec-
utive #4; our emphasis added).
The process described by these executives of ‘picking the eyes out of’ voluntary initia-
tives, or extracting out ‘the key elements of . . . the ones that are relevant to our sort of
business’ alludes to a level of subjective interpretation of the content of voluntary ini-
tiatives. It suggests that, even though mining corporations claim to adopt certain vol-
untary initiatives, there is a level of flexibility as to what elements of the voluntary
initiative they actually address in their business systems. This supports Howard et al.’s
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(1999) finding that the adoption of a voluntary initiative does not guarantee that com-
panies follow a uniform set of practices, or comply fully with desired norms. We return
to this point later. 
Do voluntary initiatives work? An example from the Australian minerals industry
Our case study for this paper is the MCA Code. The MCA Code was launched in 1996
and became one of the longest-running voluntary initiatives that sought to address the
environmental performance of mining companies. It required mining companies to
report via a self-assessment on specific components of their environmental manage-
ment and performance (a relatively new concept in the mid-1990s); and, when the code
was reviewed in 2000, new requirements were put in place for the independent audit
of company’s reports against the Code. The Code was formally retired in January 2005
and Enduring Value, an Australian-focused implementation guidance for the ICMM Sus-
tainable Development Framework, took its place.
The Code applied to the Australian and international mining operations of the sig-
natory company: some multinational corporations only signed their Australian sub-
sidiary companies to the Code in order to avoid the international implications of this
requirement. In 2002, 39 mining companies were signatories to the Code and these
represented around 85% of Australia’s mineral production. Gunningham and Sinclair
(2001: 7, citing Gould 2000) note that there was praise from the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme for the MCA Code, which they described as ‘one of the most com-
prehensive voluntary codes yet devised for the mining industry and the only code to
require the disclosure of environmental performance’. The MCA Code was also signifi-
cant in that it was widely cited during the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Develop-
ment (MMSD)2 process as highlighting the need for the development of an international
framework, which subsequently emerged through the ICMM.3 It has also been influen-
tial in the sense that many of the people involved in recent and emerging voluntary ini-
tiatives (for example MCEP, IRMA) played an active role in relation to the MCA Code. 
The interviews quoted here took place at a crucial moment in the MCA Code’s history.
The Code had been operating within the Australian minerals industry for eight years
and work was under way to broaden it from a Code for Environmental Management to
address issues of sustainable development. A nationally focused Code for Sustainable
Development did not eventuate; the final product was, instead, the ICMM-related Endur-
ing Value. 
The MCA Code is used here as a case study to discuss three key issues in relation to
its impact: 
1. Did the Code improve environmental performance on the ground? 
2. What did the Code do? 
3. What key features would improve its effectiveness?
Did the MCA Code improve environmental performance on the ground?
The resounding response from the industry interviews was that the MCA Code had very
little, if any, impact on the mining industry’s environmental performance on the ground.
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This is a significant finding, particularly as it might be expected that those in the min-
ing industry would have a vested interest in presenting a more optimistic view of the
effectiveness of the MCA Code on improving environmental performance. 
Most mining executives remarked that the MCA Code was generally adopted by those
companies that were already performing at a relatively high level and that already had
environmental management systems in place. In the course of explaining what they did
as a result of adopting the MCA Code, mining executives typically commented that they
did not have to change their business practices in any significant way. This led several
to conclude that, from their perspective, the MCA Code had very little impact on the per-
formance of companies with existing management systems. For example: 
[The MCA Code has had] less [impact] than what we would like, in that it’s been mainly
picked up by the larger and medium-sized organisations and basically those were the
ones that were performing at a relatively high level anyway (Executive #4).
I’m not so sure it’s improved our performance. Really what we did was build the [MCA
Code] into our existing management system. It’s there, but we’re not asking our busi-
nesses to do really any separate work on it, except for the yearly report (Executive #2).
I think most, if not all, of the elements of the [MCA] Code, are encapsulated in our man-
agement system and our code of conduct and our way in which we do business . . . No,
I don’t see the Code substantially changing our business (Executive #3).
I mean, well, we’re signed up to [the MCA Code]. We haven’t actually come across any-
thing in it that’s a challenge. We’re already doing it (Executive #5).
One regulator that we spoke to held the view that the MCA Code did impact to some
degree on mining company practices. This was qualified, however, to note that any
expectations as to what the MCA Code could achieve in relation to corporate behaviour
had to be reasonable: 
It must have changed their practice to some degree because they obviously had to think
about what to put in place in order to comply and how they do that. Look, you have to be
realistic about these things. Nothing changes completely overnight and not least the cul-
tural practices in organisations of a reasonable size. So, if you have reasonable expecta-
tions of it, I think it’s probably met those (Regulator #4).
One NGO also thought that existence of the MCA Code was a positive thing, but sim-
ilarly observed that their expectations of what the Code might achieve had always been
fairly limited:
Well, they didn’t have any responsibility or requirement to report [before the MCA Code]
and now all the signatories do. They report to lesser and greater quality and that’s an
issue because there’s no requirement within the Code as to the precise nature of the
reporting or the standard that they would report to . . . As a historical event the Code has
certainly been worth it. Even from where I think we sit, it’s been a useful exercise. It
didn’t do everything that they thought it would but we knew that right from the start
(NGO #1).
What did the MCA Code do?
If the primary function of the MCA Code was not its impact on the environmental per-
formance of its signatories, what did it do? From the perspective of the Code signato-
ries interviewed for this research, the accomplishments of the MCA Code fell into three
interrelated categories: reporting; measuring performance; and public perception.
Reporting 
The fact that the MCA Code got the Australian mining industry reporting on their envi-
ronmental performance was seen as one of its key achievements. One executive felt that,
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as a result of impact of the MCA Code, Australian mining companies were global lead-
ers in the area of public reporting: 
We went from having nobody reporting to, I think prior to some industry consolidation,
around 35 or 40 companies producing public environment reports. So we’ve been doing
that sort of from the mid-90s and as a result we are much further advanced than most
sectors and so I think that’s been very positive. I think in a way the Australian minerals
industry has had a leadership position globally in terms of our public reporting (Execu-
tive #1).
Measurement of performance
Mining executives liked the fact that the MCA Code provided an independent point of
reference on how they were performing. They could use the Code to measure their own
performance internally (as a self-assessment, at least for the first four years of its oper-
ation) and then make comparisons with other companies (subject to the limitations of
a self-assessed measure). Opportunities to discuss experiences and outcomes at MCA
committee meetings and conferences also gave them a means and common language
for assessing their own environmental management relative to others. 
Public perception
Mining executives pointed to the reporting and measurement dimensions of the MCA
Code as very useful means for communicating with many of their stakeholders. For
example: 
I think it’s been a useful code to present a united face of the industry. I think it’s been
very useful in convincing the government that we’ve been doing something (Executive
#2).
. . . we needed to find ways to tell our stakeholders that we were performing to these
standards. Things like the Code and public reporting . . . offered us an opportunity to
actually move beyond where others perceived us to be (Executive #4).
These findings highlight that reputation was the key motivator for adopting the Code.
It appears that, from the perspective of industry, the usefulness of voluntary initiatives
centre on their relative value for communicating corporate environmental performance
to their stakeholders.
Key factors to improve the effectiveness of the MCA Code
The five key effectiveness factors for voluntary initiatives were monitoring, transparency,
enforcement, content and compulsoriness. In our research, these factors have corre-
lated closely with critical observations from industry and some of its stakeholders as to
the deficiencies of the MCA Code. 
Monitoring 
One of the main criticisms of the Code was the lack of independent verification of assess-
ment of performance. In 2000, a provision for independent auditing of company reports
was introduced; however, for some this fell short of more rigorous third-party processes
for verification of performance. Developing systems for credibly measuring perfor-
mance was a major challenge. There were examples where companies’ self-assessments
were:
. . . down-rated somewhat since the independent assessment [requirement was intro-
duced]—but it’s just natural for people to assess themselves favourably (Executive #3).
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The Code itself was fairly simple at the end of the day. It’s much more difficult to develop
systems that actually show companies are performing to and beyond the requirements
of the Code (Executive #4).
Transparency
For the MCA Code, concerns about transparency were mainly discussed in the context
of reporting and monitoring. For example: 
I suppose in my mind the impact [of the MCA Code] has weakened a bit, because I haven’t
seen many actually hitting their first compulsory audit and I haven’t seen much report
back on that (Regulator #4).
Enforcement 
The lack of clear repercussions for non-compliance—for example, penalties or even
expulsion (‘to be outed!’, in the words of Executive #2)—was another main criticism of
the Code. For some executives, the importance of reputation served as a sufficient
enforcement mechanism. However this is a relatively weak and indirect mechanism
requiring action on the part of other stakeholders rather than the Code itself. 
Content
A major criticism from industry and NGOs alike was that the MCA Code was systems-
based rather than outcomes-focused. In this, the standards were found to be difficult to
verify against. They were also perceived to be not challenging enough, so could not func-
tion to lift performance levels. For example:
The problem with a lot of these voluntary codes like [the MCA Code] is that . . . in terms
of trying to seek agreement from the participants you end up at the lowest common
denominator. You don’t end up with something that’s creating a leading-edge position
(Executive #5).
Compulsoriness
In spite of what could be seen as a low entry point, the MCA Code failed to engage with
smaller companies in its design or as signatories, largely attracting only the higher-pro-
file companies. It was noted that few external pressures (for instance, quicker licensing
approvals, relationships with NGOs) were harnessed that might effectively coerce small
and medium-sized mining companies to adopt the MCA Code. This drew attention to
the ‘free-rider’ problem:
. . . it’s often those companies that aren’t signed up to those codes that most need to be
signed up (NGO #4).
What does impact on performance? When asked what would be the best way to deal
with underperformers in the minerals industry, the candid answer from a mining exec-
utive was: 
Government regulation. It’s that simple. If it’s made legal or illegal to do something,
then that will dictate behaviour and anything else is secondary, quite frankly (Executive
#4).
How, then, might voluntary initiatives that possess these key effectiveness factors differ
from command-and-control regulation? This question is considered in the next section,
with a particular focus on the apparent paradox of ‘compulsory’ voluntary initiatives.
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‘Compulsory’ voluntary initiatives? 
What would a regulatory instrument look like that incorporated all of the key effective-
ness factors for voluntary initiatives? Theoretically, it might exhibit the advantages of
both ‘command-and-control’ regulation and voluntary initiatives. It would be designed
to address core issues that result in improved performance on the ground; it would be
a cost-effective, flexible and reviewable instrument, responsive to industry’s needs and
with the potential for transboundary application; and its adoption would be compulsory
with compliance maximised using monitoring, enforcement, transparency and sanc-
tions. 
A composite picture of a ‘compulsory voluntary initiative’ is emerging and it is sus-
piciously similar to the oft-cited nemesis of the voluntary initiative, ‘command-and-con-
trol’ regulation. ‘Command-and-control’ instruments have been defined as a ‘form of
law having broad goals and using specific direct means to achieve the goals’ (Gunning-
ham and Sinclair 2002: 191, drawing on Teubner 1983). Similarly, the European Envi-
ronment Agency4 applies the following definition: ‘command-and-control instruments
(e.g. mechanisms, laws, measures) rely on prescribing rules and standards and using
sanctions to enforce compliance with them’. 
However, ‘compulsory voluntary initiatives’ and ‘command-and-control’ instruments
can be distinguished by the nature of the institutions that create, administer and enforce
them. Traditional command-and-control regulation arises from what is predominantly
a state regulatory mechanism, which tends to limit their transboundary potential. Vol-
untary initiatives, on the other hand, represent an evolution towards private rather than
public institutions and hold potential for global application (Cohen 2006: 36). Private-
sector mechanisms seek to ‘harness market, peer and community energies to influence
behaviour and draw on the infrastructure of intermediaries such as industry associa-
tions, standards organisations and non-governmental organisations for rule develop-
ment and implementation’ (Webb 2006a: 4). 
The ‘private’ provenance of voluntary initiatives should make us wary of embracing
the notion of a ‘compulsory voluntary initiative’ as a panacea to the problem of corpo-
rate environmental impacts. The implications more generally of privatising regulation
are problematic and include the possibility of unclear responsibility for setting stan-
dards, increased influence of business considerations in designing standards, a dimin-
ishing of democratic channels of participation (as a result of participation being by
selection based on deemed interest, potential contribution or perhaps anticipated agree-
ment) and weaker public control and access to information. Gleckman (2004) is one
observer who warns that the power balance between public and private interests in rela-
tion to environmental issues is currently too far tilted in favour of short-term private-
sector interests. 
There are also indications that some of the proposed benefits of ‘compulsory volun-
tary initiatives’ might be difficult to balance or reconcile. For example, ensuring that an
initiative is both cost effective and able to effect real change on the ground is a key chal-
lenge. The industry participants in our research, for example, stated that the adoption
of the MCA Code caused them to make few changes to their practices. This meant that
its adoption was cost-effective; but would it have still been so if it had required them to
implement dramatic changes? What, then, are its prospects for broad sectoral adoption,
let alone compulsoriness? As discussed in the MCA Code case study, the process of reach-
ing agreement in the standards-setting process often results in compromise to the low-
est common denominator. 
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Similarly, there may be a tension between a voluntary initiative’s flexibility and com-
pliance, particularly with regard to the complete implementation of its stated require-
ments. As our discussion of the ‘translation’ of voluntary initiatives within companies
indicated, adopted instruments are not always comprehensively implemented. The flex-
ibility of voluntary initiatives is touted as one of their benefits, particularly in terms of
application in a range of environmental and social contexts. However, their malleabil-
ity needs to be tempered to ensure that the claimed intentions of the voluntary initia-
tive are being achieved. Accordingly, less flexibility may be required to ensure greater
consistency between the corporate policy adoption of voluntary initiatives and their
impact on performance on the ground. 
Understanding voluntary initiatives—compulsory or not—as a form of private regu-
lation highlights the dependence between the relative power of stakeholder interests in
the development process and the prospects for impact on on-the-ground performance.
While we certainly appear to be moving towards a global environmental regulatory par-
adigm where government and corporations share regulatory responsibilities (Arnold
and Whitford 2006: 9), the critical dimensions are going to be power and authority. The
increasing influence of business interests in regulatory mechanisms, both public and
private, hold implications for a reduced consideration of the importance of the public
good and an increased importance placed on reputation and value to the company
through adoption. The question of making voluntary initiatives compulsory only serves
to highlight the blurred lines of authority (and thus motivation) for the shaping of reg-
ulatory governance. With so much at stake, this is likely to continue to be a contested
domain for all those with an interest in improving environmental performance.
Conclusions 
So, on balance, do voluntary initiatives in the mining industry work? They certainly
appear to, in terms of reputation, communication with stakeholders and general aware-
ness-raising within companies. However, a demonstrated effect on environmental per-
formance, as explored with the specific example of the MCA Code, is more difficult to
attribute directly to the adoption of voluntary initiatives. The process of ‘translation’ of
voluntary initiatives into company systems highlights an inherent subjectivity in imple-
mentation. In essence, an industry initiative can probably be said to ‘work’ in the inter-
ests of its designers, mostly by addressing aspects of their social licence to operate. 
There are a number of key factors—monitoring, transparency, enforcement, content
and compulsoriness—that hold prospects for enhancing the efficacy of voluntary ini-
tiatives. New initiatives such as IRMA are drawing on the experiences and lessons of the
last decade of initiative development and are focused on key factors such as monitor-
ing, transparency, content and broad participation in design. However, the reputational
stakes, which tend to motivate company participation and the inherent power issues in
the process of development, are still likely to be complicating factors.
While making voluntary initiatives compulsory may offer a means for recapturing
some of the benefits of mandatory command and control-style regulation, it is by no
means a panacea. Idealising a composite picture of a compulsory voluntary initiative
leaves aside the broader problem of private, but mandatory, regulation. Privatisation of
regulation raises significant questions of authority, responsibility and influence in envi-
ronmental governance, which appear to point to the diminishing of importance of pub-
lic interests. 
Voluntary initiatives seem likely to at least remain, if not increase, as a significant reg-
ulatory tool in capitalist societies, particularly for issues that are global, international,
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sectoral or thematic and which impact directly on private-sector reputation. Importantly,
they do not diminish the role of government-directed regulation and, indeed, are widely
seen to be complementary. However, their increasing influence means they must con-
tinue to be watched carefully regarding their claims for effectiveness in changing per-
formance.
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